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ABSTRACT 
Spoofing with falsified IP-MAC pair is the first step in most of the LAN based-attacks. Address Resolution 
Protocol (ARP) is stateless, which is the main cause that makes spoofing possible. Several network level 
and host level mechanisms have been proposed to detect and mitigate ARP spoofing but each of them has 
their own drawback. In this paper we propose a Host-based Intrusion Detection system for LAN attacks, 
which works without any extra constraint like static IP-MAC, modifying ARP etc. The proposed scheme is 
verified under all possible attack scenarios. The scheme is successfully validated in a test bed with various 
attack scenarios and the results show the effectiveness of the proposed technique.  
KEYWORDS 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In Local Area network (LAN), when two hosts want to communicate with each other, they need 
to know the MAC address of each other. If the communicating host does not know MAC address 
of the destination, it sends an ARP request to the broadcast domain asking for the MAC address 
corresponding to the destination host’s IP address. The destination host identifies that the ARP 
request is meant for its IP address and hence, sends back its MAC address in a unicast ARP reply 
packet. Most of the LAN based attacks are launched by sending falsified IP-MAC pairs to the 
host being targeted. The victim machine assumes the MAC address in the forged ARP packet as 
the genuine MAC address associated with the IP. Now when the victim machine wants to 
communicate with the system having the given IP, it sends all packets to the false MAC address 
(i.e., to a different host the attacker wants the victim to send). Attacks based on falsified IP-MAC 
pairs are feasible because host updates its ARP cache without verifying the genuineness of the IP-
MAC pair of the source [1]. Also, the hosts cache all the ARP replies sent to them even if they 
had not sent an explicit ARP request for them. In other words, ARP spoofing is possible because 
of the stateless nature of the ARP. Various mechanisms have been proposed to detect and mitigate 
these ARP attacks at both the host-level and network-level. In [2], a literature review on network 
based IDS for detecting ARP spoofing attacks with their drawbacks have been discussed. The 
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authors also present a new network based IDS to detect such spoofing attacks and highlights how 
many of the drawbacks are eliminated. The present paper is focused towards development of a 
host based IDS for ARP spoofing based attacks. So, all discussions regarding existing techniques 
for ARP attack detection are confined to host-based ones; the techniques can be broadly classified 
as follows. 
 
1.1 Static ARP [3] 
 ARP related attacks can be avoided completely by manually as-signing static IP addresses to all 
the systems in the network [3]. The ARP cache of the host has the static mapping of IP-MAC 
pairings of all other hosts inside the net-work. Since these entries are immutable, any spoofed 
packets will be blindly ignored by the kernel. However, this solution is not applicable to large 
networks because of the problem of scalability and management especially in a dynamic 
environment. 
 
1.2 Stateful ARP [4, 5] 
The technique is based on extending the existing the standard ARP protocol by modifying the 
ARP cache from a stateless to a stateful one. Here, the host has a state ARP cache which holds 
the states of the previous requests and verifies the replies with it. Two queues requestedQ and 
respondedQ are used to store the state information of cache. Now the incoming responses are 
matched from corresponding requestedQ and enters into responded queue till timeout. 
 
A major problem in the Stateful ARP based approach is that Gratuitous request/reply, is not 
supported. Moreover, the modification of stateless cache to stateful cache requires the extension 
of the protocol specification thereby making it more complex. ARP is basically designed to keep 
the protocol simple and so, modification to standard ARP is not desirable. 
 
1.3 Cryptographic Solutions [6, 7] 
Another solution is to utilize the cryptographic techniques to prevent the ARP attacks. The 
limitation of such techniques is that each host has to maintain the public key for every other host 
in network. Also, all the hosts inside the network must be configured to understand the new 
protocol which requires the upgradation of the network stacks of all the systems involved. 
Moreover, lots of processing overhead for the signature generation, verification and key 
management is involved. 
 
1.4 Signature based IDS [8] 
 Signature based IDS like Snort [8] can be used to detect ARP attacks, but the main problem here 
is the generation of a large number of false alarms. Furthermore, the ability of IDSs to detect all 
forms of ARP related attacks are limited [9]. 
 
1.5 Software based Solutions [10-12] 
 Many software solutions are commercially available such as, ARPWATCH, Arp-Guard, X-ARP 
etc. These software basically maintain a table with IP-MAC associations and any change in the 
association is immediately reported to the system administrator. The problem with this approach 
is, if the first sent packet itself is having a spoofed MAC address then the whole system fails. 
Further, any genuine change in IP-MAC pair will be discarded (e.g., when notified by Gratuitous 
request and reply). 
 
1.6 Active techniques for detecting ARP attacks 
In active detection based techniques, probe packets are sent across the network to get the 
information of the suspected host for which the IP-MAC pair has been changed. Several active 
techniques for detecting ARP attacks have been reported; they are briefly discussed below. 
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In [13], a database of known IP-MAC pairs is maintained and on detection of a change the new 
pair is actively verified by sending a TCP SYN packet as the probe. Also, any new pair of IP-
MAC is first verified by the probing technique before entering it in the database. On receiving the 
probe, the genuine system will respond with SYN/ACK or RST depending upon whether the port 
is open or not. This scheme is able to detect ARP spoofing attacks but it violates the network 
layering architecture. 
Another means to confirm the authenticity of the receiving ARP response packet is by crafting a 
RARP request packet [14], which seeks the IP address corresponding to the given MAC address. 
By comparing the IP addresses of the responses, MAC cloning might be detected. However, a 
single MAC address may genuinely correspond to a number of IP addresses, in which case, a lot 
of false positives could be generated. In a similar scheme proposed in [15], ARP probe packets 
(instead of RARP request packet) are used for IP-MAC validation of the source host from which 
an ARP packet is received. Unicast ARP probe packets are sent to the host (identified by the 
MAC) for verification. If a mismatch occurs in the IP addresses of the probe reply compared to 
the ARP packet being verified, spoofing is notified. The scheme follows the network layering 
concepts but fails if the attacker is spoofing some IP with its own MAC address. This is because 
the unicast ARP probe generated by the IDS will go only to the attacker (identified by the MAC) 
and it would reply back with the same spoofed IP associated with its MAC. 
Hence, from the review it may be stated that an ARP attack prevention/detection scheme needs to 
have the following features 
– Should not modify the standard ARP or violate layering architecture of network – Should 
generate minimal extra traffic in the network  
– Should detect a large set of LAN based attacks – Hardware cost 
of the scheme should not be high  
In this paper, we propose an active host based IDS (HIDS) to detect a large set of ARP related 
attacks namely, malformed packets, response spoofing, request spoofing and denial of service. 
This technique does not require changes in the standard ARP and does not violate the principles 
of layering structure. Finally, we present a proof of completeness and correctness of the proposed 
scheme.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the proposed approach. In 
Section 3 we discuss the test bed and experimental results. In Section 4 we prove the correctness 
of the proposed approach. Finally we conclude in Section 5. 
2. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section we discuss the proposed host-based active intrusion detection scheme for ARP 
related attacks. The following assumption is made regarding the LAN 
– Non-compromised (i.e., genuine) hosts will send a response to an ARP request within a 
specific interval Treq.  
2.1    Data Tables for the Scheme 
The proposed IDS running in a host ensures the genuineness of the IP-MAC pairing (of any ARP 
packet it receives) by an active verification mechanism. The IDS sends verification messages 
termed as probe requests upon receiving ARP requests and ARP replies. To assist in the probing 
and separating the genuine IP-MAC pairs with that of spoofed ones, we maintain some 
information obtained along with the probe requests, ARP requests and ARP replies in some data 
tables. The information and the data tables used are enumerated below. Henceforth in the 
discussion, we use the following short notations: IPS - Source IP Address, IPD - Destination IP 
Address, MACS - Source MAC Address, MACD - Destination MAC Address. Fields of any table 
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would be represented by 〈TableName〉〈field〉; e.g., RQTIPS represents the source IP filed of 
“Request-sent table”. Also, 〈TableName〉MAX  represents the maximum elements in the table at a 
given time. 
1. Every time an ARP request is sent from the host querying some MAC address, an entry is 
created in the “Request-sent table” (denoted as RQT) with the destination IP(RQTIPD) of 
the ARP packet. Also the time t when the request was sent is recorded in the table as 
RQTτ. Its entries timeout after Treq seconds. The value of Treq will depend on the ARP 
request-reply round trip time, which can be fixed after a series of experiments on the 
network. According to [15], the approximate ARP request-reply round trip time in a LAN 
is about 1.2 ms - 4.8 ms.  
2. Every time an ARP reply packet is received by the host from any other system in the 
network, an entry is created in the “Response-received table” (denoted as RST ) with its 
source IP (RSTIPS) and source MAC (RSTMACS). Also the time when the response was 
received is recorded in the table. Its entries timeout after Tresp seconds. The Tresp value can 
be determined based on the ARP cache timeout value of the host. 
3. When some IP-MAC pair is to be verified, an ARP probe is sent and response is verified. 
The probe is initiated by the HIDS, upon receiving either a Request or a Response. The 
source IP address and the source MAC address from the Re-quest/ Response packets used 
for verification are stored in “Verification table” (de-noted as VRFT). The entries in this 
table are source IP (VRFTIPS) and source MAC (VRFTMACS).  
4. Every time any IP-MAC pair is verified and found to be correct, an entry is created for 
the pair in the “Authenticated bindings table” (denoted as AUTHT). There are two fields 
in this table, IP address (AUTHTIP) and MAC address (AUTHTMAC).  
2.2    Algorithms of the IDS 
The proposed HIDS algorithm has two main modules namely, ARP REQUEST-HANDLER() and 
ARP RESPONSE-HANDLER() to handle incoming and outgoing ARP packets respectively. The 
modules are discussed below: 
Algorithm 1 processes all the ARP request packets received by the host. For any ARP request 
packet RQP received, the HIDS first checks if it is malformed (i.e., is there any change in the 
immutable fields of the ARP packer header or different MAC addresses in the MAC and ARP 
header field) or unicast; if so, a status flag is set accordingly and stops further processing of this 
packet. 
The HIDS next finds whether the packet received is a Gratuitous ARP request and the status flag 
is set accordingly. Gratuitous ARP request can be determined if RQPIPS == RQPIPD. For such 
Gratuitous ARP request, ARP probe is sent for checking the correctness of the IP-MAC pair. 
Hence, the VERIFY IP-MAC() module is called for RQP along with t (the time information when 
RQP was received). 
If neither of the above cases match, then RQPIPS is searched in the Authenticated bindings table. If 
a match is found as AUTHTIPS [i](where i is the ith entry in the AUTHT) and the corresponding 
MAC address AUTHTMACS[i] in the table is same as RQPMACS, the packet has genuine IP-MAC 
pair which is already recorded in the Authenticated bindings table. In case of a mismatch in the 
MAC address (i.e., RQPMACS ≠ AUTHTMACS[i]) the packet is spoofed with a wrong MAC address 
and hence the status flag is set as spoofed. It may be noted that this checking of spoofing could be 
done without ARP probe thereby reducing ARP traffic for verification. 
 
Also, it may be the case that IP-MAC pair given in RQPIPS is not verified as yet and no entry can 
be found in Authenticated bindings table corresponding to RQPIPS. In such a case, an ARP probe 
is to be sent by the HIDS to RQPIPS and RQPMACS for verifying the correctness of the RQPIPS-
RQPMACS pair. This is handled by the VERIFY IP-MAC() module with RQP and τ as parameters. 
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2.2.1 Algorithm 1: ARP REQUEST HANDLER 
Input: RQP - ARP request packet, t - time at which RQP was received, Request-sent table, 
Verification table, authenticated bindings table 
 
 
Output: Updated Request-sent table, Status 
 
1: if (RQP is malformed) then  
 
2: Status=malformed  
 
3: else if (RQP is Unicast) then  
 
4: Status=Unicast  
 
5: else  
 6: if (RQPIPS == RQPIPD) then  
 
7: Status=Gratuitous Packet  
 
8: VERIFY IP-MAC(RQP, τ)  
 
9: else  
 
10: if (RQPIPS  == AUTHTIPS[i] (for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ AUTHTMAX ) then  
 
11: if (RQPMACS == AUTHTMACS [i]) then  
12: Status= Genuine  
 
13: else  
 
14: Status=Spoofed  
 
15: end if  
 
16: else  
 
17: VERIFY IP-MAC(RQP, τ)  
 
18: end if  
 
19: end if  
 
20: end if  
 
Algorithm 2 is an ARP response handler. For every ARP response packet RSP received by the 
host, the HIDS determines whether the reply is malformed; if malformed, a status flag is set 
accordingly and the next packet is processed. Otherwise, the source IP (RSPIPS), source MAC 
(RSPMACS), and timestamp τ of the received packet are recorded in the Response-received table. 
Next, it verifies whether the packet is a Gratuitous ARP reply by checking if RSPIPS == RSPIPD. 
For such a Gratuitous ARP reply, an ARP probe is sent to check the correctness of the IP-MAC 
pair. Hence, the VERIFY IP-MAC() module is called. 
If the reply packet is not Gratuitous, next it verifies if it is a reply for any ARP probe sent by the 
VERIFY IP-MAC() module (i.e., ARP probe by the HIDS). The response for the ARP probe can 
be determined if RSPIPD == IP(HIDS) and RSPMACD == MACHIDS and RSPIPS has an entry in the 
Verification table. For such response packets, Algorithm 2 calls SPOOF-DETECROR() module. 
If none of the above cases holds, the reply packet is then matched for a corresponding request in 
the Request-sent table, using its source IP RSPIPS. If a match is found (i.e., RSPIPS== RQTIPD[i]), 
the RSPIPS is searched in the Authenticated bindings table. If a match is found and the 
corresponding MAC address in the table is same as RSPMACS, the packet has genuine IP-MAC pair 
(which is already recorded in the Authenticated bindings table). In case of a mismatch in the 
MAC address (i.e., RSPMACS =6 AUTHTMACS[ j]) the packet may be spoofed with a wrong MAC 
address and hence the status flag is set as spoofed. If the RSPIPS is not present in the Authenticated 
bindings table, then an ARP probe is sent for verification by the VERIFY IP-MAC() module. If 
there was no corresponding request for the response packet in the Request-sent table, then it is an 
unsolicited response packet. Hence, the UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER() is called with 
the time at which such a response is received τ. 
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2.2.2 Algorithm 2: ARP RESPONSE HANDLER 
Input: RSP - ARP response packet, t - time at which RSP was received, Request-sent table, 
Verification table, authenticated bindings table 
 
 
Output: Updated Response-received table, Status 
 
1: if RSP is malformed then  
 
2: Status= malformed  
 
3: else  
 
4: Add RSPIPS, RSPMACS  and τ to Response-received table  
5: if (RSPIPS == RSPIPD) then  
 
6: Status= Gratuitous  
 
7: VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP, τ)  
 
8: else  
 9: if ((RSPIPD == IP(HIDS) && RSPMACD == MAC(HIDS)) && (RSPIPS ==  
VRFTIPS[k]))(for some k, 1≤  k≤  VRFTMAX )) then  
 
10: EXIT  
 
11: else  
 
12: if (RSPIPS == RQTIPD[i] (for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ RQMAX )) then  
13: if (RSPIPS == AUTHTIPS[ j] (for some  j, 1 ≤  j ≤  AUTHTMAX )) then  
 
14: if (RSPMACS == AUTHTMACS[ j]) then  
15:    Status=Genuine 
16: Else 
17:    Status=Spoofed 
18: end if  
 
19: else  
 
20: VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP, τ)  
 
21: end if  
 
22: else  
 
23: UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER( τ)  
 
24: end if  
 
25: end if  
 
26: end if  
 
27: end if  
 
The main modules discussed in Algorithms1 and Algorithm 2 are assisted by three sub-modules namely, 
VERIFY IP-MAC(), SPOOF-DETECTOR() and UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER(). Now, we 
discuss these sub-modules in detail. 
VERIFY IP-MAC() (Algorithm 3) sends ARP probes to verify the correctness of the IP-MAC 
pair given in the source of the request packet RQP or response packet RSP. Every time a probe is 
sent, its record is inserted in Verification table. Before, sending the ARP probe request, we need 
to verify if there is already such a request made by the HIDS and response is awaited. This can be 
verified by checking IP and MAC in the Verification table; if a match pair is found the module is 
exited. A spoofing may be attempted if IP matches the entry in the Verification table but MAC 
does not; in this case, the status is set as spoofed. This checking in the Verification table (before 
sending probe) limits the number of ARP probes to be sent for any known falsified IP-MAC 
address, thereby lowering extra ARP traffic. If the corresponding IP address is not found in the 
Verification table, a probe request is sent and the algorithm adds the IP and the MAC into the 
Verification table. At the same time SPOOF-DETECTOR() module is called which waits for a 
round trip time and then analyzes all the entries in the Response-received table collected within 
this period (for analyzing the probe responses). 
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2.2.3 Algorithm 3: VERIFY IP-MAC 
Input: RP- ARP request/reply packet, t - time of arrival of RSP, Verification table Output: 
Updated Verification table, Status 
 
1: if (RPIPS 2 VRFTIPS[i]) (for some i, 0 ≤ i ≤ VRFTMAX ) then  
 
2: if (RPMACS == VRFTMACS[i]) then  
 
3: EXIT  
 
4: else  
 
5: Status=Spoofed  
 
6: end if  
 
7: else  
 8: Send ARP Probe Request to RPIPS  
 9: Add RPIPS  and RPMACS  to the Verification table  
 
10: SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP, τ)  
11: end if  
 
SPOOF-DETECTOR() (Algorithm 4) is called from VERIFY IP-MAC() after sending the ARP 
Probe Request to source IP of the packet to be checked for spoofing (RPIPS). As discussed, it is 
assumed that all replies to the ARP probe will be sent within Treq time. So, SPOOF-DETECTOR() 
waits for Treq interval of time, thereby collecting all probe responses in the Response-received 
table. As it is assumed that non-comprised hosts will always respond to a probe, at least one 
response to the probe will arrive. In other words, in one of the replies to the probe, genuine MAC 
for the IP RPIPS would be present. Following that, Response-received table will be searched to 
find IP-MAC (source) pairs having IP of RPIPS. If all IP-MAC pairs searched have same MAC, 
packet under question is not spoofed. In case of the packet being spoofed, more than one re-ply 
will arrive for the probe, one with genuine MAC and the other with spoofed MAC. The reason for 
assuming more than one reply in case of spoofing is explained as follows. Let a packet be spoofed 
as IP(of B)-MAC(of D). Now for the ARP probe to B, B will reply with IP(of B)-MAC(of B) 
leading to tracking the attacker (MAC (of D)). To avoid self identification, attacker D has to reply 
to all queries asking for B with spoofed IP-MAC pair IP(B)-MAC(D). The IDS has no clue 
whether IP(B)-MAC(D) or IP(B)-MAC(D) is genuine; only possibility of spoofing is detected. 
 
If a spoofing attempt is determined the status is returned as spoofed and it is exited. If the packet 
is found genuine, Authenticated bindings table is updated with its source IP (RPIPS) and the 
corresponding MAC. 
2.2.4 Algorithm 4: SPOOF-DETECTOR 
 
Input: RP- ARP request/reply packet, Treq - Time required for arrival of all responses to an ARP 
probe (ARP request-reply round trip time), Response-received table Output: Updated 
Authenticated bindings table, Status 
 
1: Wait for Treq  time interval  
 
2: if (RPIPS == RSTIPS [i]) & & (RPMACS ≠ RSTMACS[i])(for some i,1≤ i ≤ RSTMAX )  
    then  
 
3: Status=Spoofed  
 
4: EXIT  
 
5: end if  
 
6: Update Authenticated bindings table with RPIPS,RPMACS  
 
UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER() (Algorithm 5) is invoked whenever an unsolicited 
ARP reply packet is received (i.e., ARP reply packet did not find a matching ARP request in the 
Request-sent table) and is used for detection of denial of service (DoS) attacks. In general, ARP 
replies are received corresponding to the ARP requests. If more than a certain number of 
unsolicited responses are are sent to a host within a time window, it implies an attempt of DoS 
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attack on the given host. Algorithm 5 maintains an “Unsolicited response counter (denoted as 
URSPcounter) for storing the number of unsolicited responses received by the host within a 
specified time interval (δ) and declares DoS attack if the number of unsolicited ARP replies 
within a time interval (δ) exceeds a preset threshold DoSTh. 
2.2.5 Algorithm 5: UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER 
 
 
Input: τ - Time when RSP is received, δ- Time window, DoSTh- DoS Threshold, Un-solicited 
response table 
 
 
Output: Status 
 
1: if (τ −URSPτ< δ ) then  
 
2: URSPcounter++  
 
3: URSPτ=τ  
 
4: if (URSPTcounter  > DoSTh) then  
 
5: Status=DoS  
 
6: EXIT  
 
7: end if  
 
8: else  
 9: URSPcounter=1  
 
10: URSPτ=τ  
11: end if  
 
2.3 An Example  
 
In this sub-section we illustrate ARP response verification in normal and spoofed cases. Consider 
a network with four hosts - A, B, C, D and host D is the attacker. HIDS be installed on all the 
hosts which need to be secure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example of a Normal and Spoofed Reply 
 
Figure 1 shows the sequence of packets (indicated with packet sequence numbers) injected in the 
LAN when (i) host B is sending a genuine reply to B with IP(B)-MAC(B) followed by ARP probe 
based verification (of the reply) by the HIDS at host A, (ii) attacker D is sending a spoofed reply 
as “IP(C)-MAC(D) ” to host A and its verification by the HIDS at host A. The sequences of 
packets as recorded in Request-sent table, Response-received table, Verification table and 
Authenticated bindings table in the HIDS running in host A are shown in Table 1 - Table 4. 
 
2.3.1 Genuine reply from B to A and its verification 
 
– Packet Sequence (PS) 1: Reply is sent by B to A for informing its MAC address (to B). 
Assume this reply packet to be a gratuitous reply or a response to a request sent by A, so that 
it is not considered unsolicited. Response-received table is updated with a new entry IP(B)-
MAC(B) .  
 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.3, No.3, May 2011 
171 
 
 
– Packet Sequence 2: Since there is no entry for IP-MAC of B in Authenticated bindings table, 
the HIDS A will send an ARP Probe to verify its correctness and hence an entry is made in the 
Verification table.  
– Packet Sequence 3: Following PS 2, SPOOF-DETECTOR() starts. Within Treq only B will 
respond to this ARP Probe request and Authenticated bindings table is up-dated with the valid 
entry of IP-MAC of B.  
 
2.3.2 Spoofed reply from D to A and its verification 
 
– Packet Sequence 4: Let D respond to A with IP of C and its own MAC (D), which is recorded 
in the Response table. As in the above case, we consider this reply packet to be solicited.  
 
– Packet Sequence 5: Since there is no entry for IP-MAC of C in Authenticated bindings table, 
the HIDS A will send an ARP probe to know C’s MAC. Hence, IP(C)-MAC(D) is entered in 
the Verification table.  
 
– Packet Sequence 6 and 7: SPOOF-DETECTOR() is executed. Within Treq, both C and attacker 
D will respond to the ARP Probe request (sent to know MAC of B) with their own MACs. 
These responses are recorded in the Response table.  
 
There are two entries in Response table for IP(C), one is MAC of C and the other is MAC of 
D. So response spoofing is detected by the HIDS running at A.  
 
    
Table 2. Response-received table 
 
Table 1. Request-sent table 
 
PS SRC IP SRC MAC 
 
 
      
1 
 
IP B 
 
MAC B 
 
 
 
PS DST IP 
  
3 
 
IP B 
 
MAC B 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
  
4 
 
IP C 
 
MAC D 
 
 
     
6 
 
IP C 
 
MAC D 
 
 
      
7 
 
IP C 
 
MAC C 
 
 
Table 3. Verification table 
 
 
Table 4. Authenticated bindings table 
 
       
 
 PS IP MAC          
     PS MAC    
 2 IP B MAC B       
     IP B MAC B    
 5 IP C MAC D       
          
 
 
 
 
3. EXPERIMENTATION 
The test bed created for our experiments consists of 5 machines running different operating 
systems. We name the machines with alphabets ranging from A-D. Machines A-D are running 
the following OSs: Ubuntu 9.04, Windows XP, Windows 2000 and Backtrack 4, respectively. 
The machine D with Backtrack 4 is acting as the attacker machine. HIDS is installed in all 
genuine machines. 
 
The tables mentioned above are created in mysql database. The algorithms are implemented 
using C language. The HIDS has two major modules namely, Packet grabber and Packet 
injector. Packet grabber sniffs the packets from the host’s network interface card (NIC), filters 
the ARP packets and invokes either the Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 depending upon the packet 
type - request or response. The Packet injector module generates the ARP probes necessary for 
the verification of IP-MAC pairs. Attack generation tools Ettercap, Cain and Abel were 
deployed in machine D and several scenarios of spoofing MAC addresses were attempted. 
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Table 5. Comparison of ARP Attack Detection Mechanisms 
ATTACKS PROPOSED 
ACTIVE 
[13] 
X-ARP 
[12] 
ARPWATCH 
[10] 
ARPGUARD 
[11] 
ARP spoofing Y Y Y Y Y 
ARP DoS Y N N N N 
Malformed Packets Y Y Y N N 
 
In our experiments we tested our proposed scheme with several variants of LAN attack scenarios 
(including the one discussed in the example above). Table 5 presents the types of LAN attacks 
generated and detected successfully by the proposed scheme. Also, in the table we report the 
capabilities of other LAN attack detecting tools for these attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. ARP Traffic 
Figure 2 shows the amount of ARP traffic generated in the experimentation in 4 cases. The first 
case is of normal operation in the absence of the IDS. Second case is when the IDS is running 
and there are no attacks generated in the network. Third case is when we injected 100 spoofed 
IP-MAC pairs into the LAN and IDS is not running. Fourth case is when we injected 100 
spoofed IP-MAC pairs into the LAN with IDS running. We notice almost same amount of ARP 
traffic under normal situation with and without IDS running. Once genuine IP-MAC pairs are 
identified (by probing) they are stored in Authenticated bindings table. Following that no 
probes are required to be sent for any ARP request/reply from these IP-MAC pairs. In case of 
attack, a little extra traffic is generated by our IDS for the probes. With each spoofed ARP 
packet, our IDS sends a probe request and expects at least two replies (one from normal and the 
other from the attacker), there by adding only three ARP packets for each spoofed packet. 
4. ANALYSIS OF COMPLETENESS AND CORRECTNESS 
In this section we prove the completeness of the algorithm IDS using different scenarios of ARP 
spoofing attacks. In this paper, hosts are identified by alphabets, a for example, and IP (MAC) 
address of the host is represented by IP(a) (MAC(a)). Before the proof, certain definitions are 
given. 
4.1 ARP spoofing attack 
 In ARP spoofing attack a malicious host m sends an ARP request/response packet to another 
host p in the LAN with falsified IP-MAC pair. In the response/request packet being sent, IP 
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address of host v IP(v) is associated with MAC address of host k MAC(k), where v ≠ k and v;k ≠ 
p. In other words, an ARP request or response packet is created and sent by m which has source 
IP-MAC pair as IP(v)-MAC(k). When response/request packet with IP(v)-MAC(k) is sent to p, it 
updates its cache with IP(v)-MAC(k) and all packets p wants to send v will reach k. The attack is 
said to be created with falsified IP-MAC pair “IP(v)-MAC(k)” against victim v by m. 
4.2 Victim Machine 
 A machine in the LAN whose network traffic can be redirected to some other machine is called 
the victim machine. In Definition 4, host v is the victim machine as traffic being sent by p to v is 
redirected to k. 
 
An interesting case occurs if ARP attack is created with IP(v)-MAC(k), where v is the malicious 
host (i.e., v = m). In this case, malicious host m sends an ARP request/response packet with IP(m)-
MAC(k) (m ≠ k) to another host p. So all packets p wants to send m will reach k. So in this case 
attacker becomes the victim. 
 
We assume the following in our arguments. 
 
– The set of IP addresses in the LAN corresponding to which the hosts are up is I. – The set of 
IP addresses in the LAN corresponding to which the hosts are down is I′.  
 
We will study completeness of the IDS in two scenarios of the LAN. In the first case let all 
the machines in the LAN are up and running. In the second case, there may be some machines 
which are down. In this case, we will also see the situation when such machines are powered up 
after an attack is launched against them. 
4.2.1 Theorem 1 
 The IDS detects all ARP spoofing attacks except the case where attacker becomes the victim, 
when all IP address in I are used. 
 
Proof. We prove the theorem by enumerating all possible combinations of IP-MAC pairs 
generated by malicious host. Let there be a single malicious host m in the LAN having IP-MAC 
pair IP(m)-MAC(m); later we will show that the theorem holds for multiple malicious hosts also. 
It is assumed that Authenticated and Spoofed tables are empty. 
There are 5 cases for IP-MAC combinations that can be generated by m–(A) IP(m)-MAC(m), (B) 
IP(v)-MAC(v) (IP(v) ∈ I ≠ IP(m)), (C) IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I ≠ IP(m)), (D) IP(m)-MAC(v) 
(v≠ m), (E) IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I, v ≠ k and v;k ≠ m). 
 
Now these cases are analyzed one by one. (A), (B) do not correspond to spoofed cases. The rest 
are analyzed as follows. The analysis is shown when the malicious host uses a request packet for 
sending the falsified IP-MAC pair. Same argument will hold when the malicious host uses a 
response packet for sending the falsified IP-MAC pair. 
4.2.1.1 Case 1–IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I≠ IP(m)) 
 If ARP request packet with IP(v)-MAC(m) is sent by m to the host, then REQUEST-
HANDLER() generates a RQP event. As Authenticated and Spoofed tables are empty, probe 
request is sent by IDS for verification and PRQP event is generated. As the probe request is 
broadcast it is received by all hosts. So this probe request is also received by the malicious host m 
and may respond in the ways enumerated below. However, in all cases the genuine host  will 
reply to the probe using an ARP response packet having source IP-MAC pair as IP(v)-MAC(v); 
for this the RESPONSE-HANDLER() generates a PRSP event, whose MAC address is not same 
as that of MAC address of the request being verified.  
 
 Variations of Responses of m  
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(a) m may not give any reply. So there will be only one reply having IP(v)-MAC(v) (from 
genuine host v).  So, in all, the following sequence of events is received by the IDS –
RQP,PRQP,PRSP; the MAC address of PRSP (MAC address of IP-MAC pair sent with 
probe response, MAC(v)) is not same as that of MAC address of the request packet being 
verified (having MAC address MAC(m)).  
 
RQP: The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found false 
as source IP and destination IP’s are not same (Algorithm 2, Step 5). Then it will compare the 
IP(v)-MAC(v) pair with that of IDS (Algorithm 2, Step 9), but no match will be found. Then it 
will check request sent table for a match with IP(v) (Algorithm 2, Step 12); no match will be 
found. Next on comparison with authentication binding table (Algorithm 2, Step 13), also no 
match will be found (assuming RSP was not verified earlier). This will result in calling of 
VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) (Algorithm 2, Step 20) which then will verify if IP(v) is in verification 
table (Algorithm 3, Step 1). Since it will not find any match, a probe will be sent (Algorithm 3, 
Step 8) to IP(v)and IP(v), MAC(m) will be recorded in verification table (Algorithm 3, Step 9) 
and call the SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP,τ) (Algorithm 3, Step 10). The SPOOF-DETECTOR will 
wait for Treq time interval (Algorithm 4, Step 1) and then verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP (Algorithm 
4, Step 2), will find a match. Also it will compare the MAC(v) (Algorithm 4, Step 2), will find a 
mismatch for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into the declaration of the packet be 
spoofed with a wrong MAC address and hence the status flag will be set as spoofed. So IP(v)-
MAC(m) is correctly identified to be spoofed.  
Also, the reply from v with IP(v)-MAC(v) leads to tracking the attacker (MAC(m)). To avoid self 
identification, attacker m has to give a single reply to all queries asking for MAC of v with 
spoofed IP-MAC pair IP(v)-MAC(m); this mimics as if IP(v)-MAC(m) was normal. The IDS has 
no clue whether IP(v)-MAC(v) or IP(v)-MAC(m) is genuine; only possibility of spoofing is 
detected. In other words, to avoid being detected, if the attacker sends a spoofed packet IP(v)-
MAC(m) say, then for all ARP requests for MAC of IP(v) it would send a reply with the same 
spoofed MAC address (i.e., MAC(m)) that it has used in spoofing. This behavior of attacker is 
assumed for all queries for MAC address it has spoofed. With this assumption, the case of one 
reply having IP(v)-MAC(m) from m is analyzed as follows.  
(b) One reply having IP(v)-MAC(m) from m. It may be noted that the sequence in which 
host v and host m respond to the probe request is not fixed. Let v respond before m. The 
two response packets (one from v and the other from m) are processed by RESPONSE-
HANDLER() as two PRSP events. So, in all, the following sequence of events is 
received by the IDS–RQP,PRQP,PRSP,PRSP; the MAC address of first PRSP is 
different from the of MAC address of the request being verified and the MAC address 
of second PRSP is same.  
(c) The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found 
false as source IP and destination IP’s are not same. Then it will com-pare the IP(v)-
MAC(v) pair with that of IDS, but no match will be found. Then it will check request 
sent table for a match with IP(v), will not find a match. Next on comparison with 
authentication binding table, also no match will be found (assuming it was not verified 
earlier). This will result in calling of VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) which then will verify 
if IP(v) is in verification table. Since it will not find any match, a probe will be sent to 
IP(v)and record IP(v), MAC(v) in verification table and call the SPOOF-
DETECTOR(RP,τ). The SPOOF-DETECTOR will wait for Treq time interval and then 
verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP, will find a match, compare the MAC(v), will find a 
mismatch for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into the declaration of the 
packet be Spoofed and hence the status flag will be set as Spoofed. So IP(v)-MAC(m) is 
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correctly identified to be spoofed.  
Now, let m respond before v. In this situation, sequence of events received is by the IDS is–
RQP,PRQP,PRSP,PRSP, where the MAC address of first PRSP is same as the MAC address of 
the request being verified and the MAC address of second PRSP is different.  
 
The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found false as 
source IP and destination IP’s are not same. Then it will com-pare the IP(v)-MAC(v) pair with 
that of IDS, but no match will be found. Then it will check request sent table for a match with 
IP(v), will not find a match. Next on comparison with authentication binding table, also no 
match will be found (assuming it was not verified earlier). This will result in calling of 
VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) which then will verify if IP(v) is in verification table. Since it will 
not find any match, a probe will be sent to IP(v)and record  
IP(v), MAC(v) in verification table and call the SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP,τ). The SPOOF-
DETECTOR will wait for Treq time interval and then verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP, will find a 
match, compare the MAC(v), will find a match for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into 
the declaration of the packet be Genuine but as soon as the second PRSP from v will arrive and 
the algorithm will execute in the same fashion but a mismatch will be detected in this step and 
Spoofing will be detected and hence the status flag will be set as Spoofed.  
 
So IP(v)-MAC(m) is correctly identified to be spoofed. 
 
4.2.1.2 Case 2–IP(m)-MAC(v) (v ≠ m) 
 REQUEST-HANDLER() generates a RQP event on receipt of the request packet sent by m 
having IP(m)-MAC(v). Following that probe request is sent by IDS for verification of MAC 
address (MAC(v)) associated with IP address (IP(m)) of the request packet and PRQP event is 
generated. This probe request sent to query MAC address of IP(m). Even of the request is 
received by all hosts, as all hosts except m are genuine, only m would respond. According to the 
assumption in Case-1, m will respond to the probe as IP(m)-MAC(v); the case is analyzed as 
follows.  
 
(a) One reply with IP(m)-MAC(v). REQUEST-HANDLER() generates event PRSP.  
So, in all, the following sequence of events is received by the IDS –RQP,PRQP,PRSP; the 
MAC address of PRSP is same as that of MAC address of the request being verified.  
The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found false 
as source IP and destination IP’s are not same. Then it will com-pare the IP(v)-MAC(v) 
pair with that of IDS, but no match will be found. Then it will check request sent table for 
a match with IP(v), will not find a match. Next on comparison with authentication binding 
table, also no match will be found (assuming it was not verified earlier). This will result in 
calling of VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) which then will verify if IP(v) is in verification table. 
Since it will not find any match, a probe will be sent to IP(v)and record IP(v), MAC(v) in 
verification table and call the SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP, τ). The SPOOF-DETECTOR will 
wait for Treq time interval and then verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP, will find a match, 
compare the MAC(v), will find a match for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into 
the declaration of the packet be Genuine.  
So IP(m)-MAC(v) is incorrectly identified to be genuine. It may be noted that if response to 
the probe has same MAC address as that of the request being verified, it is determined to 
be genuine. In other words, if no response to the probe has different MAC address 
compared to the request being verified, it is determined to be genuine.  
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4.2.1.3 Case 3–IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v);IP(k) ∈, v ≠ k and v;k ≠ m) 
 REQUEST-HANDLER() generates a RQP event on receipt of the request packet sent by m 
having IP(v)-MAC(k). Following that probe request is sent by IDS for verification and PRQP 
event is generated. As the probe request is broadcast it is received by all hosts. As v is genuine it 
will respond by a ARP response packet having IP(v)-MAC(v), whose MAC is different than the 
one in the request packet being verified. The attacker will respond to this probe as IP(v)-MAC(k). 
Attack is detected by the IDS because there is at least one repone to the PRQP whose MAC is 
different from the request packet being verified. So IP (v)-MAC(k) is correctly identified to be 
spoofed. 
From the enumeration above, only Case 2 Subcase (a) is the condition when spoofing is detected 
as genuine; i.e., spoofing attack cannot be detected. Case 2 corresponds to IP(m)-MAC(v) (v ≠  
m). Let m send a request with IP (m)-MAC(v) (v ≠  m) to host p, which updates its cache 
accordingly. So all traffic p wants to send m will reach v; so Case 2 corresponds to condition 
where m is also the victim (in addition to being a malicious host). 
From the theorem the following corollary follows. 
Corollary 1 
If all responses to the probe sent by IDS for verifying any request/response packet has same MAC 
address as that of the packet being verified, the IDS determines normal condition. If at least one 
response to the probe sent by IDS for verifying any request/response packet has different MAC 
address compared to the packet being verified, then IDS determines spoofed condition. 
Proof.  Follows from construction of IDS and illustrated in Theorem 1. 
In the next theorem we will show that Theorem 1 also holds when there is more than one 
malicious host. Before that Theorem 1 is restated as follows: 
Let IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) 2 I =6 IP(k)) be sent in a spoofed request/response by malicious host m. 
Spoofing can be detected if v ≠ m. 
The elaborate proof given above for Theorem 1 can be summarized as follows. 
As shown in Corollary 1, spoofing is detected if at least one response to the probe sent by IDS for 
verification has different MAC address compared to the packet being verified. If IP (v)-MAC(k) is 
sent (by m), then IDS sends a probe (by broadcast) to query the MAC address associated with 
IP(v). If v ≠ m, then v is genuine and as IP(v) 2 I (i.e., v is up) it will reply with IP(v)-MAC(v); as 
the reply has different MAC address compared to the packet being verified, spoofing can be 
detected. 
Hoverer, if v = m, then v is itself the attacker. The IDS probe request is sent to query MAC 
address of IP(v = m) and no genuine host would reply. The malicious host m will reply with 
spoofed ARP reply whose MAC address is deliberately kept same as the one in the packet being 
verified. So IP(v)-MAC(k) is falsely determined to be genuine. It may be noted that IP(v = m)-
MAC(k) is the case where attacker is the victim. 
4.2.2 Theorem 2 
 Let the set of malicious hosts in a LAN be M. Let IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I ≠ IP(k)) be sent in a 
spoofed request/response by malicious host m 2 M. Spoofing can be detected if v 2= M. 
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Proof. As shown in Corollary 1, spoofing is detected if at least one response to the probe sent by 
IDS for verification has different MAC address compared to the packet being verified. If IP (v) - 
MAC (k) is sent (by m), then IDS sends a probe to query MAC. 
Address associated with IP(v). As v∉ M, IP(v) ∈ (i.e., v is up) and malicious hosts cannot stop v 
from responding, it will reply with IP(v)-MAC(v). Along with the reply from v, other malicious 
hosts can also reply to the probe request, however, cannot stop detection of spoofing because 
reply sent by v has different (correct) MAC address com-pared to the packet being verified (which 
has spoofed MAC address). 
Next we will study completeness of the IDS in the second scenario where some IPs in LAN may 
not be used, i.e., some of the machines are down. In this case we will also see the situation when 
such machines are powered up. 
4.2.3 Theorem 3 
The IDS detects all ARP spoofing attacks except the cases (i) where attacker becomes the victim 
(i.e., IP(m)-MAC(v), v ≠ m), and (ii) the IP address used in the spoofing packet corresponds to a 
machine which is down (i.e., IP(v)-MAC(k), IP(v) ∈ I′ ≠ IP(k)) 
 
Proof. We prove the theorem by enumerating all possible combinations of IP-MAC pairs 
generated by the malicious host. Let there be a single malicious host m in the LAN having IP-
MAC pair IP(m)-MAC(m).2. It is assumed that Authenticated and Spoofed tables are empty. 
 
There are 8 cases for IP-MAC combinations that can be generated by m–(A) IP(m)-MAC(m), (B) 
IP(v)-MAC(v) (IP(v) ∈ I′ ≠  IP(m)), (C) IP(v)-MAC(v) (IP(v) ∈ I′ ≠  IP(m)), (D) IP(v)-MAC(m) 
(IP(v) ∈ I′ ≠  IP(m)), (E) IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I′ ≠ IP(m)), (F) IP(m)-MAC(v) (v ≠ m), (G) 
IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I′, v ≠  k and v;k ≠  m), (H) IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I′, v ≠  k and v;k ≠ m). 
Case (A), (B), (C) do not correspond to spoofed cases. Case (D),(G) involve IP address IP(v) ≠ I; 
so this can be handled similarly as in Theorem 1. Also, Case (F) can be handled similarly as in 
Theorem 1 because it involves IP address m ∈ I (attacker is the victim). 
The rest of the cases ((E),(H)) are analyzed as follows. As in Theorem 1 the analysis is shown 
when the malicious host uses a request packet for sending the falsified IP-MAC pair. Same 
argument will hold when the malicious host uses a response packet for sending the falsified IP-
MAC pair. 
4.2.3.1 Case 1–IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I′ ≠ IP(m)) 
 REQUEST-HANDLER() generates a RQP event on receiving the packet with IP(v)-MAC(m). A 
probe request is sent by IDS for verification and PRQP event is generated. As machine with IP(v) 
is not up, there would not be any reply from v with IP(v)-MAC(v) (that has different MAC 
address than the packet being verified). Also, the malicious host m will send a reply with same 
MAC address. So, there is a condition when only one response to the probe request is received 
that has same MAC address as that of the packet being verified. By Corollary 1, IP(v)-MAC(m) is 
incorrectly identified to be genuine.  
 
4.2.3.2 Case 2–IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I′, v ≠ k and v;k ≠ m) 
 
This situation is similar to Case-1 (of Theorem 3) above. IP (v)-MAC(k) is incorrectly identified 
to be genuine.  
In Theorem 3 we have seen two conditions when a spoofed packet is determined to be genuine. IP 
address in such spoofed packets corresponds to system(s) which are down. Now we will see the 
condition when such a system comes up. 
Let a spoofed packet having IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v)∈ I′ ≠ IP(k)) be detected as genuine; so IP(v)-
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MAC(k) is entered in Authenticated Table. After, v comes up, it sends a gratuitous request with 
IP(v)-MAC(v); REQUEST-HANDLER() generates a RQP event. Following that a probe request 
is sent to verify to the gratuitous request thereby generating event PRQP. Host v responds to the 
probe request with IP(v)-MAC(v). Now malicious host will respond to the probe by IP(v)-MAC(k) 
(k ≠ v), which has different MAC address corresponding to the gratuitous request being verified. 
So, gratuitous request is incorrectly determined to be spoofed and the falsified IP-MAC pair 
IP(v)-MAC(k) (v ≠ k) remains to be kept in the Authenticated table. 
 
The following points can be deduced from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 regarding the consequences 
of the cases when a spoofed request/reply is determined to be genuine (i.e., false negative cases). 
 
Theorem 1  
 
Spoofed IP-MAC pairs for the case “when attacker itself is the victim”, is missed to be detected. 
This does not lead to a serious consequence because no genuine host can be victimized (by 
diverting its traffic to some other host). So other attacks like man-in-the-middle, denial of service 
etc. which require diverting traffic sent to genuine hosts (to malicious hosts) cannot be launched.  
Theorem 3  
Spoofed IP-MAC pairs for cases “(i) when attacker itself is the victim” and “(ii)IP address used in 
a spoofed packet corresponds to a machine which is down” are missed to be detected. Further, 
even after the machine comes up, spoofing cannot be detected. Case (ii) may lead to serious 
consequence as traffic intended to a genuine host would be diverted to malicious host.  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we have presented an HIDS for detecting some of the LAN specific at-tacks and 
verified the same under all possible circumstances. The scheme uses an active probing mechanism 
and does not violate the principles of network layering architecture. This being a software based 
approach does not require any additional hardware to operate. 
At present the scheme can only detect the attacks. In other words, in case of spoofing it can only 
determine the conflicting IP-MAC pairs without differentiating the spoofed IP-MAC and genuine 
IP-MAC pair. If to some extent diagnosis capability can be pro-vided in the scheme, some 
remedial action against the attacker can be taken. 
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